定義本身並不重要。但是，當你的壞帳堆積如山的時候，你會對定義產生興趣。我覺得，中國的銀行系統以外的信貸幾乎全部是次貸，包括租賃公司和信託公司的資產。很多公開發行或者私募發行的債券（不管什麼評級）都是垃圾債券，或者叫高息債券。咱們的很多發行人所付的息率不高，那只是因為定價錯誤而已。
非銀行金融機構從根本上說，就是銀行的垃圾桶或者污水管道。
Why do we misprice subprime credit?
In 2011 when I left UBS to run a microcredit firm in China, I was confident of making a fortune. How could it go wrong? Borrow at 7% and lend at 24%. Sure, there were taxes, expenses, bad debts and so on. But smart guys like me should win.
Before long, I was humbled by bad debts and wrote a book about my failure: Inside China’s Shadow Banking.
In recent decades, millions of Chinese have tried and mostly failed in subprime lending. They are P2P, consumer lending, SME finance, credit guarantees, merchant funding, leasing, supply-chain financing, etc). The death tolls:
(1) Well over 70% of the 10,000 microcredit firms either shut or are paralysed.
(2) Of the 10,000 guarantee companies (CDS issuers), only a few hundred are surviving.
(3) In the 1990s, all trust & investment companies failed and their reincarnations are now dying too.
(4) P2P platforms? Much worse.
(5) SME financiers and supply-chain financiers? Do not mention them.
We all underestimated delinquency. Our interest rates should have been much higher. And most borrowers should have never been lent to.
Why did we consistently misprice subprime? Overoptimism? Foolishness? Volatile economy? Weak laws? Asymmetric info? I will do some research.
